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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3364 
___________ 
 
VIRGINIA KURSCHINSKE, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MEADVILLE FORGING COMPANY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00087) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2012 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Filed:  June 1, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Virginia Kurschinske, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting the defendant’s motion to mark as satisfied the judgments entered against it in 
the underlying action.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
In April 2006, Kurschinske commenced a gender discrimination action in the 
District Court against her former employer, Meadville Forging Company.  Following a 
jury trial in January 2008, the District Court entered a judgment of $25,000.00 in her 
favor (“Judgment I”).  Meadville Forging issued a $25,000.00 check to Kurschinske on 
June 26, 2008.  The court subsequently awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Kurschinske 
and her attorney, Susan Mahood, in the amount of $46,763.21 (“Judgment II”). 
It appears that a dispute then arose between Kurschinske and Attorney Mahood 
regarding Judgment II.  Specifically, Kurschinske claimed that she was entitled to 
$16,094.53 of the attorney’s fee award based on her agreement with Attorney Mahood.  
According to Attorney Mahood, however, no such agreement existed.  In March 2009, 
Attorney Mahood commenced an action in the Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas against Kurschinske and Meadville Forging seeking to obtain payment of Judgment 
II.  Kurschinske filed a counterclaim for her alleged share of the judgment.  The state 
court found in Attorney Mahood’s favor and dismissed Kurschinske’s counterclaim.  
Accordingly, Meadville Forging issued a check for $46,763.21 payable to Attorney 
Mahood. 
 Approximately one year later, on October 5, 2010, Kurschinske returned to the 
District Court and obtained a writ of execution against Meadville Forging for the 
$46,763.21 (Judgment II) that Meadville Forging had already paid to Attorney Mahood, 
plus post-judgment interest.  In response, Meadville Forging filed an emergency motion 
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to strike the writ of execution and asked the court to deem both judgments satisfied.  The 
District Court construed Meadville Forging’s motion as one pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, following a hearing, determined that:  
(a) Meadville Forging had satisfied both judgments by paying $25,000.00 to Kurschinske 
on June 27, 2008,1 and $46,763.21 to Attorney Mahood on August 25, 2009; and 
(b) Kurschinske was collaterally estopped from prosecuting her claim for a portion of the 
attorney’s fees award by attempting to execute on Judgment II because the state court had 
already considered, and rejected, that claim.  Kurschinske filed various motions seeking 
reconsideration, but the District Court denied relief.2
II. 
 
 On appeal, Kurschinske first argues that the District Court erred in entering an 
order declaring Judgments I and II satisfied because the court’s judgment in her favor on 
the merits of her gender discrimination claim is entitled to res judicata effect.  
Kurschinske appears to believe that the District Court’s order deeming Judgments I and II 
satisfied somehow provided relief from the jury verdict to Meadville Forging.  Contrary 
to her contention, however, the District Court’s order did not disturb its previous ruling 
on the merits of her case.  The District Court had authority under Rule 60(b) to grant 
                                              
1 The District Court did determine, however, that Meadville Forging owed 
Kurschinske interest on Judgment I.  Kurschinske does not challenge this order or 
contend in her brief that it was not paid. 
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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relief from the judgments, and acted within its discretion in doing so on the ground that 
both judgments had been satisfied.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (providing that the court 
may relieve a party from a final judgment if the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged); see also AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.
Kurschinske’s second argument on appeal fares no better.  She appears to claim 
that the District Court’s ruling that Meadville Forging had satisfied Judgments I and II 
somehow violates the Supremacy Clause’s limitation on a state’s ability to enact laws 
that conflict with federal law.  This argument is both confusing and meritless.  As noted 
above, the District Court had authority under Rule 60(b) to deem Judgments I and II 
satisfied. 
, 579 
F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that Rule 60(b)(5) “encompasses the power to 
declare a judgment satisfied when damages are paid before trial or a tortfeasor or obligor 
has paid the judgment debt”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
III. 
We have considered Kurschinske’s remaining arguments and conclude that they 
lack merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.3
                                              
3 Kurschinske does not specifically challenge the District Court’s orders denying 
her motions for reconsideration.  That said, we have reviewed these orders and see no 
error in the District Court’s decisions denying relief. 
 
